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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
peals affirmed a dismissal of the complaint at the close of the plaintiff's case on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference of negligence, although recognizing that in a
death action the plaintiff will not be held to as high a degree of
proof as required in a case where the complainant may take the
stand and personally recount his version of the accident, 2 and
noting that the burden of pleading and proving contributory negligence rests on the defendant in such an action.2"
Judge Conway, in which Judge Froesopinion by
A dissenting
sel Iconcurred,
concluded
that plaintiff had at least made out a
prima facie case, and hence his complaint should not have been
'dismissed. The dissent pointed out that plaintiff need only show
facts and circumstances from which defendant's negligence reasonably may be inferred, 4 and that if any possible hypothesis
forbids imputation of fault to deceased, based on plaintiff's evidence, the dismissal of his complaint is reversible error.25 The
dissent further asserted that the existence of facts which indicate
possibilities other than defendant's negligence as the cause of
death of plaintiff's intestate does not dictate against the proposition that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case.20
The instant decision is of primary value for its collection and
delineation of various legal maxims, statutes, and rules of law applicable in wrongful death actions.
SubterraneanTrespass
The law of trespass has remained relatively stable; and a
trespass has been generally defined as the intentional (without
consensual or other privilege), entrance upon the land in possession of another, or the causing of another person or thing to do
so. 7 A trespass which is actionable under the general rule28may be
committed on, beneath or above the surface of the earth.
In Phillips v. Sun Oil Co.,2 9 the Court of Appeals in a unanimous opinion affirmed a dismissal of a count in trespass, briefly
22. Noseworthy v. City of N. Y., 298 N. Y. 76, 80 N. E. 2d 744 (1948) (subway
death).
23. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §§ 119, 131.
24. Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 275 N. Y. 1, 14 N. E. 2d 828 (1938);
LeBoeuf v. State, supra note 19.
25. Klein v. Long Island R. Co., 289 N. Y. 283, 45 N. E. 2d 445 (1942) (death at a
railroad crossing).
26. Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, supra note 24; Faber v. City of N. Y.,
213 N. Y. 411, 107 N. E. 755 (1915) ; Scantlebury v. Lehman, 305 N. Y. 713, 112 N. E.
2d 784 (1053).
27. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 158.
28. Id. § 159.
29. 307 N. Y. 328, 121 N. E. 2d 249 (1954).

THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
recapitulating the New York law on the subject. Trespass is an
intentional harm at least to the extent that the actor must intend
the act which amounts to or results in an unlawful invasion. Such
invasion must be a proximate or inevitable result of the actor's
wilful act, or one which is done so negligently that it amounts to
awilful act.
The instant case-was concerned with an alleged underground
movement of noxious fluid (gasoline) from defendant's storage
tank to plaintiff's water well. The only evidence adduced tended
merely to prove that plaintiff's well water contained a heavy concentration of gasoline similar in type to that stored in defendant's tank on adjacent property.
The leading ease in New York, and the first of its sort to be
ruled on, is Dillon v. Acme Oil Co.30 There, defendant oil company
was exonerated from liability for the pollution of plaintiff's well
on adjoining property caused by defendant's discharge on to its
land of chemicals permeating the soil. Absent negligence and
knowledge of subterranean water courses, there can be no liability
if such courses became contaminated by a person's carrying on a
legitimate business with care and skill.
The decision in the Dillon case as precedent precludes a finding 6f liability in the instant ease, for in the latter there was not
even a showing that defendant intentionally permitted gasoline to
permeate the soil, while in the former, chemicals were intentionally discharged. Hence, the general rule in New York evolves,.
that excepting activities of an extra hazardous nature, an unintentional or non-negligent physical invasion of another's property will not subject the actor to liability for harm ensuing there-

from.8 '
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Course of Employment
The requirement of law that injuries, to be compensable, must
arise "out of and in the course of the employment"' often has
Several
necessitated a searching analysis of questions of fact
such cases were decided this term.
30. 49 Hun 565. 2 N. Y. Supp. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
31. RESTATEMENT, Torts, § 166; N. Y. Steam Co. v. Foundation Co., 195 N. Y.
143, 87 N. E. 765 (1909).
1. WoRKM's COUMPNSATION LAW § 10.
2. Such problems as frolic and detour, tests of re-entry, business v. pleasure, inter
alia, have caused the courts some uneasiness. For recent discussions in this jurisdiction,
see, e. g., 3 BFLO. L. REv. 167 (1953) ; Comment, Diversionary Activities in WorkmeWs
Compensation, 17 ALBANY L. REv. 283 (1953).

